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THE ROLE OF FREEDOMS: AN INTRODUCTION 
TO THE SYMPOSIUM 
Kevin W. Saunders* 
The title of this symposium, The Role of Freedoms, only thinly disguises the 
fact that the papers presented here discuss the issues raised in John Garvey's recent 
book, What Are Freedoms For?1 In that book, Professor Garvey attacks the funda-
mental principle of c1assicalliberalism, that government must leave individuals free 
to choose what paths to follow in their lives, so long as their choices do not harm 
others. As stated by John Stuart Mill in On Liberty,2 
the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in 
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. 
. .. [T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. 
His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. 3 
Mill goes on to explain that the position is meant to apply only to "human be-
ings in the maturity of their faculties."4 He further explains that "from this liberty of 
each individual, follows the liberty, within the same limits, of combination among 
individuals."5 Mill, thus, takes the position that each of us should be free to make 
self-regarding choices, and that faced with such a choice, the government should not 
push us in either direction.6 
In contrast to Mill, Professor Garvey argues that not all choices are equal.7 
One of two paths may be worth protecting, and individuals should have a right or 
freedom to follow that path.8 The opposite path may not lead to any societal good 
worth protection.9 Thus, rights or freedoms are not goods in themselves. 10 Instead, 
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1. JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? (1996). 
2. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LmERTY (John Grayed., Oxford Univ. Press 1991) (1859). 
3. Id. at 14. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. at 17. 
6. Id. at 17-19. 
7. See GARVEY, supra note 1, at 5-19. 
8. See id. 
9. See id. 
10. See id. 
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they serve to protect other social goods. II 
Professor Garvey is, of course, not the first to criticize Mill's conclusion. 
Shortly after Mill published On Liberty, Sir James Fitzjames Stephen responded, in 
his book Liberty, Equality, Fraternity.12 Stephen asserted that English criminal 
law 
affirms in a singularly emphatic manner a principle which is absolutely incon-
sistent with and contradictory to Mr. Mill's-the principle, namely, that there 
are acts of wickedness so gross and outrageous that, self-protection apart, they 
must be prevented as far as possible at any cost to the offender, and punished, 
if they occur, with exemplary severity. 13 
Stephen did not accept Mill's distinction between solely self-regarding acts and acts 
affecting others. He found it impossible to determine how much influence the acts 
of an individual may have, and felt that it was, at times, a proper objective of criminal 
law to make people better human beings. 14 
The Mill-Fitzjames Stephen debate was reprised as the Hart-Devlin debate, 
after the 1957 issuance of what became known as the Wolfenden Report. ls That 
report, on homosexuality, prostitution, and the criminal law, draws its unofficial 
name from the chairman of the committee that drafted the report, Sir John Wolfen-
den. 16 The committee's analysis, in large part, followed Mill's thinking. Among the 
committee's recommendations was that "homosexual behaviour between consenting 
adults in private should no longer be a criminal offence."17 
Lord Patrick Devlin, then a judge of the Queen's Bench, responded to the 
Wolfenden Report in the 1958 Maccabaen Lecture of the British Academy.ls Lord 
Devlin, following Stephen, argued that society does have the right to enforce its 
morality.19 He attempted, however, to provide additional reasons for the position, 
beyond the simple recognition that British law had always enforced morality.2o He 
asserted that a society is a community of ideas, and that the ideas that make up the 
community are not solely political ideas but include ideas as to how people should 
behave.21 "Every society has a moral structure as well as a political one: or rather, 
11. See id. 
12. JAMES FrrzIAMES STEPHEN, LmERTY, EQUAllY, FRATERNITY (1873), reprinted in JAMES 
FITZJAMESSTEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY AND'fHREEBRIEFEssAYS (1991). 
13. [d. at 162. 
14. [d. at 151. 
15. REPORT OF THE COMMmEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENCES AND PROSTITUTION, 1957. 
16. See id. at 2. 
17. /d. Cmnd. 62, at 25. 
18. LoRD PATRICK DEVUN, MACCABAEAN LECTURE IN JURISPRUDENCE READ AT THE BRITISH 
ACADEMY (1959), reprinted in PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965). 
19. [d. at 1-20. 
20. /d. 
21. [d. at 9. 
HeinOnline -- 47 Drake L. Rev. vii 1998-1999
1998] Symposium Introduction 
since that might suggest two independent systems, I should say that the structure of 
every society is made up of both politics and morals."22 Society has the right to 
protect itself from dangers, including protecting its political system from external 
attack or internal sedition. From that right, Devlin finds a parallel for society's 
morality. 23 
[A]n established morality is as necessary as good government to the welfare of 
society. Societies are 'disintegrated from within more frequently than they are 
broken up by external pressures. There is disintegration when no common mo-
rality is observed and history shows that the loosening of moral bonds is often 
the first stage of disintegration, so that society is justified in taking the same 
steps to preserve its moral code as it does to preserve its government and other 
essential institutions. The suppression of vice is as much the law's business as 
suppression of subversive activities; it is no more possible to define a sphere 
of private morality than it is to define one of private subversive activity .... 
There are no theoretical limits to the power of the State to legislate against 
treason and sedition, and likewise I think there can be no theoretical limits to 
legislation against immorality. 24 
As to how the moral judgments of society are to be identified, Devlin tells us to look 
to the views of the man on the street, "the man in the Clapham omnibus."25 
Oxford professor H.L.A. Hart responded to Devlin's Maccabaen Lecture in 
a 1959 article titled Immorality and Treason26 and in a later book titled Law, Liberty 
and Morality.27 Hart's central criticism of Devlin's argument was that 
[Devlin] appears to move from the acceptable proposition that some shared 
morality is essential to the existence of any society to the unacceptable propo-
sition that a society is identical with its morality as that is at any given moment 
of its history, so that a change in its morality is tantamount to the destruction 
of a society. The former proposition might be even accepted as a necessary 
rather than an empirical truth depending on a quite plausible definition of soci-
ety as a body of men who hold certain moral views in common. But the latter 
proposition is absurd. Taken strictly, it would prevent us from saying that the 
morality of a given society had changed, and would compel us instead to say 
that one society had disappeared and another one taken its place .... [E]ven if 
the conventional morality did so change, the society in question would not 
have been destroyed or "subverted." We should compare such a development 
not to the violent overthrow of government but to a peaceful constitutional 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 13. 
24. Id. at 13-14 (citations omitted). 
25. Id. at 15. 
26. H.L.A. Hart, Immorality and Treason, in THE LAW AS LITERATURE 220 (Louis Blom-
Coopered., 1961). 
27. H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY (\963). 
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change in its form, consistent not only with the preservation of a society but 
with its advance.28 
Hart's position that society's morality may evolve implies that changes are not 
necessarily destructive and certainly do not reach the level of destructiveness that 
would be analogous to a forceful attempt to overthrow the political structure of that 
society. Devlin is then left with the position that, once a society reaches a moral 
consensus on some position, that position is so worth retaining that it may be en-
forced by the criminal law. His appeal to self-preservation does not provide the 
strength necessary to support such a claim. 
Professor Garvey has attempted to provide the justification Lord Devlin fails 
to establish. While Professor Garvey does not contend that the destruction of society 
is always at issue, some paths lead to a better society than do the paths leading in the 
opposite direction. As will be explained in his paper, it is those paths that lead to the 
good of society that are protected by rights or freedoms, while the government may 
be free to restrict travel on the opposing path. The papers that follow respond to the 
position taken by Professor Garvey. 
28. /d. at 51-52 (footnote omitted). 
